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explicitly	 Hayekian	 frame,	 has	 long	 been	 promoted	 as	 superior	 to	
planning	and	regulation	as	a	means	of	governing	economic	activity.3		
To	be	sure,	most	economists	long	ago	abandoned	the	simple	no-
tion	of	price	 formation	 that	populates	 introductory	economics	 text-
books.	Price	theory,	to	the	extent	that	it	represents	a	defined	subfield	
within	economics,	has	been	refined	and	adjusted	over	the	years	to	ac-
commodate	 all	 manner	 of	 concerns	with	 the	 functioning	 of	 imper-


































their	 competitive	 levels,	 regulation	 is	 sometimes	 called	upon	 to	 re-
store	competition	and	 thus	allow	prices	 to	return	 to	 their	 “natural”	
state.7	
This	overly	stylized	story	ignores	for	the	most	part	the	complex	
ways	 in	which	prices	are	actually	made	 in	many	markets.	 It	asserts	
rather	 than	 investigates	 the	 functioning	 of	 particular	 price	mecha-
nisms	 in	 particular	markets.	 Like	 any	 powerful	metaphor,	 the	 idea	



























AN	 INQUIRY	 INTO	THE	NATURE	AND	CAUSES	OF	THE	WEALTH	OF	NATIONS	 83	 (1796)	 (“The	
price	of	monopoly	is	upon	every	occasion	the	highest	which	can	be	got.	The	natural	
price,	 or	 the	 price	 of	 free	 competition,	 on	 the	 contrary,	 is	 the	 lowest	which	 can	 be	
taken.	.	.	.	The	one	is	upon	every	occasion	the	highest	which	can	be	squeezed	out	of	the	
buyers,	or	which	it	is	supposed	they	will	consent	to	give:	The	other	is	the	lowest	which	
































structures	of	markets:	 the	 social,	 cultural,	 and	 technical	 conditions	 that	make	 them	
possible”);	Fabian	Muniesa,	Yuval	Millo	&	Michel	Callon,	An	Introduction	to	Market	De-
vices,	in	MARKET	DEVICES	2	(Michel	Callon	et	al.	eds.,	2007)	(describing	the	roles	played	
by	 a	wide	 array	 of	market	 devices	 in	 constructing	markets	 such	 as	 analytical	 tech-
niques,	pricing	models,	aggregate	indicators,	and	trading	protocols);	Trevor	Pinch	&	


























By	 investigating	 the	 micro-level	 details	 of	 how	 prices	 are	 actually	
formed,	we	 can	 begin	 to	 see	 how	 seemingly	 technical	 questions	 of	
market	 design	 are	 fundamental	 to	 broader	 questions	 about	 power,	
distribution,	and	the	political	economy	of	markets.		
In	keeping	with	such	a	perspective,	this	Article	argues	that	prices,	
and	 the	 ways	 of	 price	 making	 that	 stand	 behind	 them,	 are	 never	
simply	facts	or	things	that	emerge	out	of	markets,	but	instead,	are	on-
going	objects	of	struggle.12	To	that	end,	one	of	the	key	objectives	of	









































restructure	 previously	 regulated	 industries	 by	 unbundling	 certain	
components	and	subjecting	them	to	competition.15	In	the	process,	dis-
tinctive	 ways	 of	 price	 making	 have	 taken	 shape	 in	 these	 markets;	






duced.	We	shall	at	 last	 force	 the	secret	of	profit	making.”);	see	also	WALTER	MATTLI,	
DARKNESS	BY	DESIGN:	THE	HIDDEN	POWER	IN	GLOBAL	CAPITAL	MARKETS	4	(2019)	(“Markets	
are	more	 than	 simple	 coordination	 systems	or	 ‘disembodied’	meeting	places	of	 de-
mand	and	supply.	They	are	organizations	governed	by	their	own	rules	and	regulation.	
Moreover,	markets	are	deeply	political	organizations	or	governance	systems	where	
contending	groups	of	members	or	stakeholders	are	 frequently	embroiled	 in	 intense	







Apparently	minor	matters—‘technicalities,’	 often	 technicalities	 little	 understood	 by	
non-participants—can	have	big	effects,	.	.	.	giving	advantages	to	some	actors	and	some	





























ural	 gas	 and	 electricity	 markets	 across	 California	 and	 the	 western	
United	States,	ultimately	costing	the	California	economy	as	much	as	
forty-five	billion	dollars.17	As	this	Article	shows,	FERC	has	struggled	








































and	 how	 to	 handle	 state	 subsidies	 for	 certain	 resources	within	 the	

















formation	 in	 these	markets	 and	 has	 opened	multiple	 dockets,	 con-
vened	 technical	 conferences,	 and	 launched	 investigations,21	 it	 has	
tended	to	treat	price	making	in	largely	neutral	terms,	viewing	it	as	a	














well	 and	 developing	 a	 framework	 that	 integrates	 the	 trio	 of	 recent	 Supreme	 Court	














regulation—concerns	 that	 are	 especially	 relevant	 in	 a	world	where	
markets	of	all	sorts	are	increasingly	the	product	of	active	design.22	To	
that	 end,	 the	Article	makes	 three	 larger	 claims.	 First,	 it	 argues	 that	
while	 prices	 play	 an	 important	 epistemic	 role	 in	 coordinating	 eco-
nomic	activity	(Hayek’s	key	insight),23	such	a	view	misses	the	funda-




use	 of	markets	 to	 achieve	 various	 ends	 and	we	 can	 recognize	 (yet	
again)	that	there	is	no	pre-political	set	of	criteria	for	deciding	how	to	
harness	 the	power	of	competition	and	direct	 it	 toward	public	ends.	
Second,	 the	 Article	 argues	 that	 the	 modalities	 of	 price	 making	 are	
where	much	of	the	politics	of	markets	now	occur.	Understanding	the	





utilities),	 we	 must	 always	 remember	 that	 the	 instrumentalities	 of	
price	making	that	determine	the	terms	of	access	to	these	necessities	

















































their	misguided	 quest	 to	 develop	 a	 general	 theory	 of	 prices.	 “Ever	


































a	 “formalist	revolution”	during	the	middle	decades	of	 the	 twentieth	
century.32	Indeed,	at	almost	precisely	the	time	she	was	writing,	formal	
































Needless	 to	 say,	 this	 growing	 formalization	 of	 economics	 had	
widespread	implications	for	the	field	and	marked	an	end	to	an	earlier	
era	of	pluralism.35	Prior	understandings	of	markets	as	concrete	places	
of	 exchange	 were	 thoroughly	 subsumed	 by	 abstract	 models	 of	 the	
market	 as	 a	 price-making	 mechanism,36	 with	 prices	 increasingly	
viewed	as	signals	or	bits	of	information	that	emerged	out	of	markets.37	
Within	the	confines	of	the	neoclassical	model,	very	little	attention	was	



































contains	no	 coherent	 explanation	of	price	 formation”);	Kenneth	 J.	Arrow,	Toward	a	

























































Legal	 realists	 and	 institutional	 economists	 such	 as	 Robert	 Lee	
Hale	and	 John	Commons	 likewise	viewed	prices	and	price	 relation-
ships	in	the	context	of	a	broader	economy	of	mutual	coercion	struc-
tured	by	a	shifting	set	of	background	entitlements.42	As	Hale	put	 it,	
“prices	 and	 price	 relationships	 are	 decisive	 factors	 in	modern	 eco-
nomic	 life.”43	 They	 “account	 directly	 for	 the	 economic	 inequalities	
which	we	observe	between	different	classes	in	modern	society.”44	At	
a	more	granular	level,	Gardiner	Means,	Walton	Hamilton,	and	others	
rejected	 the	 simple	 neoclassical	 model	 of	 markets	 and	 prices	 and	
pointed	instead	to	the	ways	in	which	large	firms,	often	in	concentrated	






Nobel	 Prize	 Lecture:	 The	 Institutional	 Structure	 of	 Production	 (Dec.	 9,	 1991),	
https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/economic-sciences/1991/coase/lecture	












































study	of	 the	 conventions,	 customs,	habits	 of	 thinking,	 and	modes	of	doing	
which	make	up	the	scheme	of	arrangements	which	we	call	“the	economic	or-
der.”47	

















































omy	during	 the	middle	 decades	 of	 the	 twentieth	 century.54	 His	 de-
tailed	investigations	of	the	ways	of	price	making	in	various	industries	



































































	 58.	 See	Francesco	Guala,	How	to	Do	Things	with	Experimental	Economics,	 in	DO	

























ing	 in	particular	markets.60	Rather	than	viewing	prices	as	 facts	 that	
emerge	out	of	the	interaction	of	supply	and	demand,	these	scholars	


















effectively	 to	 intervene,	 to	 change	 the	 institutions	 that	 regulate	and	coordinate	eco-
nomic	behavior.	.	.	.	With	experimental	economics,	.	.	.	you	can	do	things	to	the	economy.	
You	can	manipulate	and	intervene	in	the	microeconomies	you	have	built	in	your	labor-






























lem	 that	 cannot	 be	 divorced	 from	politics.	 The	 technical	 aspects	 of	
price	making,	in	fact,	are	where	much	of	the	politics	of	markets	now	
reside.		




















would	 solve	 many	 of	 the	 problems	 that	 had	 plagued	 the	 cost-of-
 







	 64.	 See	United	Distrib.	Cos.	 v.	 Fed.	Energy	Regul.	 Comm’n,	88	F.3d	1105,	1122	
(D.C.	 Cir.	 1996)	 (observing	 that	with	 its	 natural	 gas	 restructuring	 effort	 FERC	 “has	









of	 the	specific	ways	of	price	making	operating	at	 the	heart	of	 these	
markets—a	conceptual	blindspot	that	became	painfully	apparent	dur-
ing	and	after	 the	California	energy	crisis	of	2000–01,	which	greatly	
disrupted	 both	 natural	 gas	 and	 electricity	 markets	 throughout	 the	
western	United	States.67	Among	other	things,	the	crisis	illustrated	how	
fragile	 these	 new	markets	were,	 how	 dependent	 they	were	 on	 key	

















Transmission	 Organizations]	 (“Competition	 in	 wholesale	 electricity	 markets	 is	 the	
best	way	to	protect	the	public	interest	and	ensure	that	electricity	consumers	pay	the	
lowest	price	possible	for	reliable	service.”).	




























FERC	 launched	 its	 first	 major	 restructuring	 effort	 in	 the	 mid-
1980s,	focusing	on	the	natural	gas	industry.	Taking	its	cues	from	Con-
gress,	 the	Commission	 sought	 to	 unbundle	 the	natural	 gas	 pipeline	
business,	separating	gas	sales	from	gas	transportation	and	establish-
ing	 an	 open-access	 transportation	 regime	 that	 would	 provide	 the	
foundation	for	competitive	natural	gas	markets.69	 In	contrast	 to	the	























































































viewed	as	reflections	of	 the	market	 (facts	about	 the	market)	rather	





























ments	of	a	busting	shell.	But,	 just	as	there	 is	a	definite	center	of	gravity	of	 the	shell	












Price	 indices	are	also	used	extensively	 in	particular	 industries,	
such	as	natural	 resources,	 agricultural	 commodities,	 energy,	 and	 fi-
nance,	 as	 instruments	 for	 price	 discovery	 and	 as	 benchmarks	 for	
transactions.83	The	history	of	these	kinds	of	indices	is	less	well	known,	
in	part	because	these	 indices	have	typically	grown	out	of	efforts	by	
market	participants,	 the	 trade	press,	 and	 industry	analysts	 to	 solve	
practical	 problems	 of	 pricing	 posed	 by	 certain	 types	 of	 markets.84	






































vidual	 transactions	and	making	markets	 visible.90	 They	also	 reduce	




importance,	 it	 is	 remarkable	how	 little	we	know	about	 them—how	
they	are	made,	how	they	are	used,	and	how	they	can	be	manipulated.92		
Various	types	of	price	indices	and	benchmarks	have	been	used	in	


























benchmarks	 and	 their	 growing	 importance	 in	 financial	markets);	 Andrew	Verstein,	
Benchmark	Manipulation,	56	B.C.	L.	REV.	215,	218	(2015)	(“[M]arket	manipulation	is	





BOR’s	 credibility);	 Rauterberg	 &	 Verstein,	 supra	 note	 83,	 at	 57–61	 (arguing	 for	
stronger	intellectual	property	rights	in	financial	benchmarks	such	as	LIBOR);	Fletcher,	





markets,	 in	 particular,	 grew	 up	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 a	 system	 of	 posted	
prices	 for	 crude	oil	 at	particular	 locations	and,	more	 recently,	have	
come	 to	 depend	 upon	 a	 handful	 of	 global	 benchmarks	 for	 various	





sion	actually	prohibited	 the	use	of	price	 indices	 in	natural	gas	 con-
tracts,	and	from	the	mid-1950s	to	the	early	1980s,	price	indices	were	
non-existent	 due	 to	 direct	 regulation	 of	 wellhead	 sales	 of	 natural	
gas.94	 Beginning	 in	 the	 1980s,	 however,	 as	 wellhead	 sales	 were	
 
	 93.	 See	 BASSAM	 FATTOUH,	AN	ANATOMY	 OF	 THE	CRUDE	OIL	PRICING	 SYSTEM	 30–35	
(2011)	(discussing	role	of	price	reporting	agencies	and	price	indices	in	oil	markets).	








































































for	most	wholesale	 sales	 of	 natural	 gas.	See	Natural	Gas	Wellhead	Decontrol	Act	 of	







	 97.	 See	S&P	Global	Platts	&	 Intercontinental	Exchange	(ICE)	 to	 Improve	Natural	
Gas	Price	Transparency	and	Bolster	North	America	Benchmarks:	Anonymized	ICE	Data	
























After	 collecting	 the	 transaction	data,	 the	publisher	 sorts	 it	 and	
performs	various	tests	to	analyze	its	quality.104	Anomalous	trades	are	





argues	 strongly	 against	 the	 view	 that	 these	 are	 merely	 technical	
 

























































Book value of future 
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Forward contracts for 
physical gas:
Wholesale sales to LDCs
Retail sales to various 


















































structure	 of	 the	 benchmark	 production	 process;	 and	 (3)	 can	 have	 serious	 conse-
quences	for	market	stability	.	.	.	.”);	Verstein,	supra	note	92,	at	218	(“By	their	nature,	
benchmarks	describe	a	market	based	on	some	small	slice	of	it.	Careful	manipulators	
can	bias	 that	slice.	 It	 is	daunting	to	corner	 the	world	currency	market,	but	 it	 is	 less	




























































636—discussed	 the	 importance	 of	 promoting	 market	 centers	 and	


























































gether,	 these	 activities	 resulted	 in	 significant	 increases	 in	 spot	 gas	




















































regulations	 expressly	 prohibiting	 any	 of	 these	 activities.	 Indeed,	 as	
FERC	concluded	in	its	final	report	on	the	western	energy	crisis,	none	

























had	 limited	 ability	 to	 force	market	 participants	 and/or	 price	 index	
publishers	to	disclose	specific	information.145	Nor	did	it	really	seem	to	
understand	how	 these	 indices	were	 constructed	 and	 the	 roles	 they	
played	in	the	markets.		











tive	role	that	 these	 indices	play	 in	making	prices	and,	by	extension,	































ture	of	 leaving	 the	oversight	 and	 regulation	of	 the	 indices	 to	 third-
party	index	publishers.		
Although	 the	 index	publishers	 themselves	have	 reformed	 their	






At	 this	point	 in	 time,	no	 independent	entity,	 such	as	 this	Commission,	 can	










ifornia	 crisis—that	 the	 price	 reporting	 “process	 is	 fundamentally	
flawed	 because	 the	 Trade	 Press	 data	 are	 still	 not	 subject	 to	
 
	 150.	 See,	e.g.,	Platts,	Comment	Letter	on	Notice	of	Inquiry	Regarding	Enhanced	Nat-
ural	 Gas	Market	 Transparency,	FED.	ENERGY	REGUL.	COMM’N	 No.	 RM13-1-000	 at	 6–9	
(Feb.	 12,	 2013)	 (arguing	 against	 FERC’s	proposal	 to	 require	 additional	 information	
from	price	reporting	agencies	as	well	as	mandatory	reporting	by	market	participants);	
see	also	 id.	 at	10	 (“Platts	 firmly	believes	 in	 voluntary	participation	 in	 the	price	 for-
























indices.”154	Their	 recommendation	 to	 the	FERC	Commissioners	was	
unequivocal:	“only	price	indices	calculated	from	actual	trades	that	can	















tive	 market.”159	 Somewhat	 surprisingly,	 these	 regulations	 did	 not	
require	jurisdictional	sellers	to	report	their	transactions	to	price	indi-
































nipulation	 in	 natural	 gas	 markets.163	 New	 section	 23	 directed	 the	
Commission	“to	facilitate	price	transparency	in	markets	for	the	sale	or	
transportation	 of	 physical	 natural	 gas	 in	 interstate	 commerce”	 and	











natural	 gas	 market.167	 In	 essence,	 these	 new	 regulations	 required	
market	participants	to	file	annual	reports	on	their	wholesale	transac-























submit	 information	 about	 the	 volume	 of	 gas	 shipped	 on	 their	 sys-
tems.168	According	to	the	Commission,	the	new	rules	would	instill	con-
fidence	in	the	markets	by	making	price	formation	more	transparent.	










porting	 on	 natural	 gas	 transactions	 by	 jurisdictional	 sellers.172	 Ac-







The	 responses	 to	 FERC’s	 new	proposal	were	 almost	 uniformly	
negative.	 Because	 of	 jurisdictional	 limits,	 commenters	 argued,	 the	











	 171.	 See	 Enhanced	 Natural	 Gas	 Market	 Transparency,	 Notice	 of	 Inquiry,	 141	













specific	 transactions	 might	 have	 anticompetitive	 effects.176	 For	 its	
part,	Platts	argued	that	the	information	FERC	was	seeking	from	mar-
ket	participants	and	price	reporting	agencies	was	akin	 to	 the	 infor-
mation	that	would	be	provided	by	the	“electronic	information	system”	
identified	 in	Section	23	of	 the	Natural	Gas	Act.177	As	a	 result,	Platts	
continued,	FERC	would	have	to	make	a	threshold	determination	that	




















































used	 to	 support	 the	 indices	 threatens	 to	 further	 undermine	 confi-
dence	in	the	indices	themselves	and,	in	turn,	could	hamper	the	func-
tioning	of	natural	gas	markets.185	Declining	liquidity	could	also	exac-





















(Apr.	 7,	 2017),	 https://www.naturalgasintel.com/natgas-price-index-reporting-sees	















they	have	 integrity	 and	 enjoy	 the	 full	 confidence	of	market	partici-
pants.	For	its	part,	Platts	has	taken	steps	to	shore	up	some	of	the	indi-
ces,	entering	into	a	deal	(effective	in	October	2017)	with	the	Intercon-

























	 188.	 Natural	 Gas	 Price	 Index	Data,	 NAT.	GAS	 INTEL.,	 https://www.naturalgasintel	
.com/product/ngi-price-index-data	[https://perma.cc/496K-TTAA].	























take	 the	more	 aggressive	 step	 of	 creating	 its	 own	 electronic	 infor-
mation	system	for	price	reporting	(a	public	price	 index)	 to	support	




























	 193.	 As	part	of	 its	energy	reform,	Mexico	has	developed	a	public	price	index	for	
natural	gas.	See,	e.g.,	Kristen	Tsai,	Mexico	Published	First	Monthly	Natural	Gas	Price	In-















its	 statutory	 obligations	 under	 the	 Natural	 Gas	 Act	 to	 ensure	 that	





tirely	 by	 private	 entities	 that	 refuse	 to	make	 their	 underlying	 data	
available	 for	 inspection	and	audit,	 there	 is	no	real	basis	 for	making	
such	a	determination.	At	a	minimum,	in	order	to	conclude	that	natural	


































































and	 Ancillary	 Service	 Auction	Markets:	 Theory	 and	 Practice,	in	COMPETITIVE	ELECTRIC-





	 202.	 Dispatch	 is	 the	 process	 of	 coordinating	 and	 bringing	 on-line	 generation	 to	






ultimately	 determine	 the	 resulting	 prices,	 influencing	 hundreds	 of	
millions	of	dollars	in	financial	transactions	every	day.203		





















































modest,	with	 small,	 local	power	plants	 serving	a	 limited	number	of	

































































manner	of	 choices	 regarding	bidding,	pricing,	 and	settlement	 rules;	
the	sequence	of	different	markets	for	capacity,	energy,	and	ancillary	







	 215.	 Bixby,	 supra	 note	 212,	 at	 113–14	 (reporting	 total	 improvement	 factor	 of	










































































different	 designs	 (a	 result	 of	 FERC’s	 open-architecture	 approach	 to	




















	 220.	 See,	 e.g.,	 Paul	Milgrom,	Auction	Market	Design:	 Recent	 Innovations,	 11	ANN.	
REV.	ECON.	383,	394	(2019)	(“[E]nergy	auctions	are	trickier	than	financial	auctions	be-
























tors	 that	 do	 not	 clear	 the	 market	 will	 not	 get	 committed	 or	 dis-

















	 231.	 See	 id.	at	224–25	(discussing	general	 features	of	uniform	clearing-price	de-
sign);	see	also	 id.	at	225	(“In	such	a	pricing	scheme,	generators	are	more	truthful	 in	
revealing	 their	 true	marginal	costs	by	bidding	as	close	as	possible	or	equal	 to	 their	





















would	 lead	 to	 large	 operating	 deficits	 whenever	 demand	 is	 short	 of	 capacity,	 and	
would	 bankrupt	 most	 industries,	 no	 matter	 how	 shock-proof	 their	 capital	 struc-













that	 have	 typically	 been	 the	marginal	 resource	 setting	 the	 clearing	
prices	in	the	electricity	auctions.234	This	is	further	compounded	by	the	
increasing	supply	of	renewable	generation,	given	that	these	resources	



























































ahead	market	 are	much	 greater	 than	 those	 traded	 in	 the	 real-time	
markets,	 accounting	 for	 85%	 or	 more	 of	 the	 total	 energy	 traded	
through	these	markets.245	In	essence,	the	day-ahead	market	allows	for	
the	bulk	of	the	generation	resources	needed	to	meet	demand	during	















maining	 30–55%	 comes	 from	 long-term	 bilateral	 contracts	 and	 self-scheduled	 re-







some	 refer	 to	 as	 a	 multi-settlement	 market)	 where	 the	 day-ahead	
market	generates	forward	prices	and	the	real-time	market	generates	
spot	prices.		
But	 the	 algorithms	 that	 run	 these	markets	 are	 different,	 given	







Virtual	 bidding	 (also	 known	as	 “convergence	bidding”	 in	 some	
markets)	allows	financial	 institutions	and	others	to	buy	or	sell	“vir-
tual”	 electricity	 in	 the	 day-ahead	market	 and	 then	 close	 out	 those	
trades	with	the	opposite	transaction	in	the	real-time	market.248	These	
are	financial	trades,	and	no	physical	electricity	is	ever	delivered	as	a	













































congestion	at	specific	 locations	 (where	congestion	 is	understood	as	
constraints	on	the	capacity	of	the	existing	power	lines).255	Thus,	 for	











	 252.	 See,	 e.g.,	 Constellation	 Energy	 Commodities	 Grp.,	 Inc.,	 138	 FERC	 ¶	 61,168	
(2012)	(approving	consent	agreement	regarding	manipulation	scheme	in	New	York	
ISO	market	using	virtual	bidding	to	force	price	divergence	in	day-ahead	and	real-time	























market,	 the	market	 clearing	 algorithms	 use	 information	 on	 the	 ex-
pected	state	of	 the	grid	 (the	 so-called	network	 topologies)	 for	each	
hour	of	 the	next	day	 to	compute	hourly	LMPs	 for	each	node	on	 the	
system.258	The	LMP	values	that	result	are	the	prices	that	would	be	ex-
pected	from	competition	in	the	presence	of	congestion	as	captured	by	

































































































gencies	 that	 must	 be	 modeled.264	 Designing	 a	 mechanism	 that	 can	
manage	 the	 physical,	 economic,	 and	 computational	 complexity	 of	














run	 its	 systems.	This	 is	very	much	a	smart	market.	Preferences	and	constraints	are	






















tion	 to	 the	 algorithms	 and	 software	 used	 to	 run	 these	 markets.267	





laborative,	 multi-stakeholder	 governance	 that	 allows	 for	 and	 even	
promotes	experimentation.269	In	practice,	however,	critics	charge	that	
it	sometimes	looks	more	like	a	private	club	dominated	by	industry	in-
cumbents	 and	 used	 to	 block	 competition	 from	 clean	 energy	 re-
sources.270	Although	FERC’s	commitment	to	work	with	market	partic-





















[https://perma.cc/55W2-PK9K].	The	most	 recent	 conference	was	 in	 June	2019.	See	























The	 Commission’s	 basic	 approach	 grew	 out	 of	 its	 experiments	
with	market-based	rates	 for	bi-lateral	 sales	of	electricity	 in	 the	 late	
1980s	and	early	1990s.273	Drawing	on	antitrust	conceptions	of	market	
power,	 the	 Commission	 developed	 ex	 ante	 screens	 to	 determine	












































































ified	 as	 amended	 18	 C.F.R.	 pt.	 35)	 (establishing	 system	 of	 market-based	 rates	 for	
wholesale	sales	of	electricity).	
	 279.	 See	Enron	Power	Marketing,	Inc.,	65	FERC	¶	61,305	(1993);	Enron	Energy	Ser-











































structured	 around	 an	 administratively	 determined	 demand	 curve	 and	 include	 very	
specific	rules	that	determine	how	various	resources	can	participate.	Daniel	Breslau	has	
described	the	PJM	capacity	market	as	a	“market-like	entity.”	See	Daniel	J.	Breslau,	De-














little	 attention.	But	 the	California	 crisis	 changed	all	 of	 that,	demon-
strating	 that	 traders	 and	 other	 market	 participants	 could	 take	 ad-
vantage	of	market	rules	and	manipulate	the	ways	of	price	making	ir-
respective	of	whether	they	had	market	power.287		








resulting	market	 prices.290	 Others	were	 designed	 to	 “fool”	 the	 soft-
ware	managing	the	markets,	particularly	the	congestion	management	
program	 run	 by	 the	 California	 Independent	 System	 Operator	 or	
CAISO.291	 Although	most	 of	 these	 strategies	were	 viewed	 as	 incon-
sistent	with	 the	anti-gaming	provisions	of	 the	CAISO	and	California	

































words,	were	 specifically	 intended	 to	 take	advantage	of	 the	uniform	
clearing-price	design	in	the	markets.	
As	a	mountain	of	post-crisis	analysis	has	made	clear,	the	Califor-








In	 the	wake	 of	 the	 crisis,	 FERC	 adopted	 new	market	 behavior	
rules	 and	 Congress	 added	 new	 anti-manipulation	 provisions	 to	 the	











































Commission’s	 electricity	 market	 surveillance	 screens	 generated	
369,230	alerts,	more	than	a	thousand	a	day	on	average.301	Needless	to	
say,	keeping	 track	of	all	of	 this	 is	no	small	 task	and	 involves	a	very	
different	skill	set	compared	to	what	the	Commission	did	prior	to	re-
structuring.	 Notwithstanding	 the	 fact	 that	 FERC’s	 enabling	 statutes	
have	changed	very	little	since	the	1930s,	it	is	fair	to	say	that	the	agency	





















































































The	 theory	behind	 the	uniform	clearing-price	auction	was	 that	
low-cost	 generators	would	 capture	 infra-marginal	 rents	 (the	differ-










considerably	 as	 a	 result	 of	 rapidly	 declining	 costs	 and	 government	

























generation,	mainly	 coal	 and	 nuclear	 power,	 but	 also	 (increasingly)	
more	expensive	natural	gas	units.311	This	has	led	to	a	proliferation	of	
efforts	inside	and	outside	of	the	markets	to	create	new	revenues	for	
particular	 types	of	generators.	Over	 the	 last	decade,	multiple	states	
have	 adopted	 various	 subsidy	 programs	 for	 certain	 types	 of	 re-
sources.312	Some	of	these	subsidy	programs	have	focused	on	encour-
aging	investment	in	new	generation	within	states	while	others	have	













forward	with	new	subsidy	programs.316	We	are	back,	 it	 seems,	 to	a	
 
	 311.	 See	U.S.	DEP’T	OF	ENERGY,	supra	note	234.	
	 312.	 See,	 e.g.,	 Five	 States	 Have	 Implemented	 Programs	 to	 Assist	 Nuclear	 Power	
Plants,	ENERGY	INFO.	ADMIN.	(Oct.	7,	2019),	https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail	
.php?id=41534	 [https://perma.cc/HEF4-PPPM]	 (discussing	 state	 programs	 in	 Con-
necticut,	Illinois,	New	Jersey,	New	York,	and	Ohio	to	support	nuclear	power	plants).	









not	 preempted	 under	 the	 FPA	 because	 there	was	 no	 “impermissible	 tether”	 to	 the	
FERC	regulated	auctions	as	in	Hughes).	




















ample	 of	 this.319	 RTOs	 and	 ISOs	 have	 also	 created	 new	 market	
 
Ohio	 legislation	 came	 under	 scrutiny	 in	 July	 2020,	when	 the	 state’s	 Speaker	 of	 the	
House	was	charged	 in	a	$61	million	bribery	scheme	associated	with	 the	 legislation.	
John	Funk,	Top	Ohio	Lawmaker	Charged	with	Accepting	$61M	Bribe	in	Scheme	To	Pass	










	 318.	 See	 PJM	 INTERCONNECTION,	 PROPOSED	 ENHANCEMENTS	 TO	 ENERGY	 PRICE	 FOR-













to	make	 the	 pragmatic	 adjustments	which	may	 be	 called	 for	 by	 particular	 circum-
stances”).	
	 319.	 See	U.S.	Dep’t	of	Energy,	Grid	Resiliency	Pricing	Rule,	Notice	of	Proposed	Rule-
making,	 82	 Fed.	 Reg.	 46,940,	 46,942–44	 (Oct.	 10,	 2017)	 (observing	 that	 “regulated	
wholesale	markets	are	not	adequately	pricing	resiliency	attributes	of	fuel-secure	gen-
eration”	and	directing	FERC	to	consider	new	pricing	rule	that	would	require	RTO	and	
















demand	 response	and	 those	 intended	 to	 correct	or	 compensate	 for	
various	“out-of-market”	supports.	As	the	electric	generation	mix	con-
tinues	to	shift	under	the	influence	of	cheap	natural	gas	and	higher	pen-
etration	of	renewables,	 there	will	 inevitably	be	additional	efforts	 to	
create	new	in-market	products	and	rules	to	deal	with	various	prob-
lems	and	“fix”	the	markets.321	
What	 is	 important	 to	 recognize	 in	 the	 current	moment	 is	 that	
these	 two	problems	are	 connected:	 as	out-of-market	payments	 fur-
ther	 depress	 clearing	 prices,	 market	 participants	 push	 that	 much	
harder	 for	 additional	 compensation	 and	 favorable	 rules	 inside	 the	







Reliability	and	Resiliency	Pricing,	 162	FERC	¶	61,012	 (2018)	 (terminating	DOE	pro-
ceeding	and	initiating	new	proceeding).	






































ports.327	 After	 an	 elaborate	 discussion	 regarding	 which	 subsidies	
were	considered	“material”	and	a	deep	dive	into	the	details	of	PJM’s	
two-stage	auction	design,	the	Commission,	in	a	split	3-2	decision,	re-
jected	 the	proposal,	 concluding	 that	 it	would	 “allow[]	 resources	 re-
ceiving	out-of-market	support	to	significantly	affect	capacity	prices	in	
a	 manner	 that	 will	 cause	 unjust	 and	 unreasonable	 and	 unduly	
 
	 323.	 These	issues	are	currently	before	the	Commission	in	the	context	of	efforts	to	























































a	 system	of	bureaucratic	pricing	so	pervasive	 that	 it	would	have	made	 the	Kremlin	
economists	in	the	old	Soviet	Union	blush”).	
	 332.	 See	Calpine	 Corp.	 v.	 PJM	 Interconnection,	 LLC,	 163	 FERC	¶	 61,236	 para.	 2	
(2018)	(“With	each	such	subsidy,	the	market	becomes	less	grounded	in	fundamental	
principles	of	supply	and	demand.”);	see	also	 id.	at	para.	150	(finding	that	PJM’s	pro-
posed	 capacity	 market	 reform	 “fails	 to	 protect	 the	 integrity	 of	 competition	 in	 the	
wholesale	 capacity	 market	 against	 unreasonable	 price	 distortions	 and	 cost	 shifts	
caused	by	out-of-market	support	to	keep	existing	uneconomic	resources	in	operation,	









would	 create	 the	 most	 administrative	 construct	 of	 all.	 In	 short,	 the	 cure	
would	be	worse	than	the	alleged	disease.333	
Simply	put,	there	is	no	way	to	insulate	these	markets	from	the	price	
“distorting”	 effects	 of	 public	 policy.334	 All	 generating	 resources	 are	
subsidized	or	penalized	in	one	way	or	another	and	the	proliferation	of	








incoherence	of	ongoing	appeals	 to	 free	markets	and	a	 level	playing	
field	 in	 the	 current	 debates.337	Whatever	 one	 thinks	 of	 his	 politics,	
 












	 335.	 See	Coal.	 for	Competitive	Elec.	 v.	 Zibelman,	906	F.3d	41,	57	 (2d	Cir.	 2018)	
(“FERC	uses	auctions	to	set	wholesale	prices	and	to	promote	efficiency	with	the	back-










































competition	and	 imperfect	 regulation	working	directly	at	 cross-purposes	with	each	
other.”).	
	 338.	 Timothy	Cama,	Perry:	 ‘There	Is	No	Free	Market	 in	the	Energy	Industry,’	HILL	








	 339.	 Cf.	 Danny	 Cullenward	&	 Shelley	Welton,	The	 Quiet	 Undoing:	 How	 Regional	
Electricity	Market	Reforms	Threaten	State	Clean	Energy	Goals,	YALE	J.	ON	REGUL.	BULL.	































tiate	 carefully	 between	 rules	 and	 products	 that	 promote	 entry	 and	
those	 that	 are	 directed	 at	 offsetting	 out-of-market	 supports	 by	 en-
hancing	prices.	This	will	not	always	be	an	easy	line	to	draw,	but	FERC	
is	in	a	better	position	to	draw	it	than	any	other	entity.	Taken	together,	










are	a	disguised	attempt	 to	perpetuate	regulation,	or	 forms	of	political	bias	 favoring	
particular	interests,	must	be	vigorously	resisted.	In	electric	power	we	are,	and	should	
be,	 talking	 about	 the	 development	 of	 a	 property-rights	 system—rights	 to	 inject	 or	
withdraw	power,	rights	of	transmission	access,	rights	to	invest	and	to	claim	the	bene-
fits	(and	incur	the	losses)	that	accrue	to	such	investment.”).	
























should	 take	 a	more	 proactive	 approach	 to	 regulating	 these	 pricing	
structures	rather	than	delegating	crucial	questions	of	their	design	to	
the	RTOs	and	ISOs.	It	is	not	obvious,	in	this	respect,	that	the	current	

















	 345.	 See	 Fed.	Energy	Regul.	Comm’n	v.	Elec.	Power	Supply	Ass’n,	136	S.	Ct.	760	
(2016);	Eisen,	supra	note	27.	
	 346.	 See,	e.g.,	Shelley	Welton,	Electricity	Markets	and	the	Social	Project	of	Decarbon-
ization,	 118	 COLUM.	 L.	REV.	 1067,	 1073	 (2018)	 (characterizing	 RTO	 governance	 as	
“quasi-private,	immensely	technocratic,	and	largely	opaque”).	





























gies	 to	 participate	 in	 order	 to	 facilitate	 the	 ongoing	 transition.	
Although	a	majority	of	the	current	FERC	Commissioners	seem	to	have	






































all	 emitting	 resources,353	 those	 same	 arguments	 could	 be	 turned	
around	 to	 support	 a	decision	 to	 impose	a	 resiliency	adder	or	 some	

















































vest	 in	an	 important	natural	 resource	with	 the	claims	of	 society	upon	 it—
price	must	draw	a	balance	between	wealth	and	welfare.355	
For	Jackson,	striking	the	right	balance	was	a	task	that	required	deep	







































But	 it	 is	worth	 going	 back	 to	Hope	 to	 consider	 the	 arguments	





public	 interest.362	 “[T]he	 public	 interest,”	 he	wrote,	 “is	 a	 texture	 of	
multiple	strands.	It	includes	more	than	contemporary	investors	and	
contemporary	consumers.	The	needs	to	be	served	are	not	restricted	
to	 immediacy,	 and	 social	 as	 well	 as	 economic	 costs	 must	 be	









making.	 By	 focusing	 only	 on	 the	 “end	 result,”	 the	majority	 opinion	

























foundational	 commitment	 to	 the	 public	 interest	 that	 animated	 the	
Natural	Gas	Act.	The	problem	in	the	Hope	case	was	thus	not	that	the	
Federal	 Power	 Commission	 had	 fixed	 the	 rates	 too	 low,	 but	 rather	
“that	the	range	of	its	vision	was	too	narrow.”366		





















	 367.	 See,	 e.g.,	FELIX	FRANKFURTER,	THE	PUBLIC	AND	ITS	GOVERNMENT	81	 (1930);	see	
also	 DANIEL	 ERNST,	 TOQUEVILLE’S	 NIGHTMARE:	 THE	 ADMINISTRATIVE	 STATE	 EMERGES	 IN	
AMERICA,	1900-1940,	 at	 24	 (2014)	 (“No	 economic	 issue	 was	 of	 greater	 concern	 to	










sentially	stripped	courts	of	 their	power	 to	review	ratemakings”);	see	also	 id.	 at	432	
(quoting	Frankfurter	in	Railroad	Commission	of	Texas	v.	Rowan	&	Nichols	Oil	Co.,	310	












































in	unlawful	activity.	Even	 though	the	members	of	 the	price-fixing	group	were	 in	no	











solution	 to	 the	 knowledge	 problem	 at	 the	 heart	 of	modern	 econo-
mies.375	For	Hayek,	the	key	to	a	well-functioning	price	system	was	ro-












adversary,	 central	 planning,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 neoclassical	 model	 of	
 
	 375.	 See	Hayek,	The	Use	of	Knowledge	in	Society,	supra	note	3,	at	526–27	(“We	must	





or	 a	 system	 of	 telecommunications	 which	 enables	 individual	 producers	 to	 watch	
merely	the	movement	of	a	few	pointers,	as	an	engineer	might	watch	the	hands	of	a	few	
dials,	in	order	to	adjust	their	activities	to	changes	of	which	they	may	never	know	more	


































knowledge	 via	 prices,	 profoundly	 influenced	 subsequent	 develop-
ments	 in	 the	 economics	 of	 information	 and	mechanism	design	 that	
have	 in	 turn	 led	 to	 all	 manner	 of	 interventions	 in	 markets.382	 In	
 
	 379.	 See,	e.g.,	Hayek,	The	Use	of	Knowledge	in	Society,	supra	note	3,	at	527	(“But	I	

















important	 precursor	 to	 the	modern	 theory	 of	mechanism	design.”);	 Robert	Wilson,	








structuring	 and	 the	design	of	California’s	 electricity	market.	Vernon	Smith,	 another	
early	proponent	of	the	application	of	mechanism	design	and	experimental	economics	
to	electricity	restructuring,	was	also	deeply	influenced	by	Hayek.	See,	e.g.,	Smith,	supra	






























































ways	 of	 price	 making	 have	 provided	 partial	 solutions	 to	 the	
knowledge	and	coordination	problems	in	these	markets	by	opening	




and	 quality	 of	 competition	 and	 the	 distribution	 of	 opportunities	




































Article	 has	 demonstrated,	 the	ways	 of	 price	making	 at	 the	heart	 of	
both	 restructured	 natural	 gas	 and	 electricity	 markets	 are	 in	 many	










lenges	 facing	other	regulatory	agencies	 in	 the	so-called	 information	











are	products	of	active	design,	 they	are	 inevitably	 subject	 to	politics	




















































































































ket.”398	 Recent	 work	 traveling	 under	 the	 label	 of	 law	 and	 political	
economy,	 the	 resurgence	 of	 interest	 in	Brandeis,	 and	 growing	 con-
cerns	about	economic	concentration	in	the	platform	economy	have	all	





















































regulation	 for	 the	 last	 fifty	 years	 and	 that	 has	 left	 policymakers,	
judges,	and	scholars	(among	others)	struggling	to	find	a	vocabulary	
with	which	to	engage	these	questions.	Viewed	from	this	perspective,	




iments	 with	 different	 institutional	 forms	 and	 practices	 (including	
markets),	all	of	which	are	(or	should	be)	grounded	in	a	commitment	
to	 fair	 prices	 and	 a	 broad	 conception	of	 the	public	 interest.	 Taking	






	“Preoccupation	with	 the	 ethics	 of	 pricing,”	 Joseph	Schumpeter	





























yond	 the	specific	cases	addressed	here	and	 increasingly	relevant	 in	
the	face	of	growing	enthusiasm	for	designer	markets	and	the	adoption	
of	new,	often	algorithmic,	approaches	to	pricing	across	the	economy.	
In	all	of	these	cases,	careful	attention	to	the	techniques	and	practices	
of	price	making	helps	to	surface	important	questions	about	politics,	
fairness,	and	the	public	interest	that	have	lain	dormant	for	too	long.		
 
 
	 402.	 JOSEPH	A.	SCHUMPETER,	HISTORY	OF	ECONOMIC	ANALYSIS	60	(1954).	
